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Abstract 
 
Purpose – Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain substantial challenges to economic and 
human developments amid growing emphasis on IPRs (with recent advances in ICTs) and 
good governance.  In the first empirical study on the incidence of piracy on inequality in 
Africa, we examine how a plethora of factors (IPRs laws, education & ICTs and government 
quality) are instrumental in the piracy-inequality nexus.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – Two-Stage-Least Squares estimation approaches are 
applied in which piracy is instrumented with IPRs regimes (treaties), education & ICTs and 
government quality dynamics.  
 
Findings – The main finding suggests that, software piracy is good for the poor as it has a 
positive income-redistributive effect; consistent with economic and cultural considerations 
from recent literature. ICTs & education (dissemination of knowledge) are instrumental in this 
positive redistributive effect, while good governance mitigates inequality beyond the piracy 
channel.  
 
Practical implications – As a policy implication, in the adoption IPRs, sampled countries 
should take account of the role less stringent IPRs regimes play on income-redistribution 
through software piracy. Collateral benefits include among others, the cheap dissemination of 
knowledge through ICTs which African countries badly need in their quest to become 
‘knowledge economies’. A caveat however is that, too much piracy may decrease incentives 
to innovate. Hence, the need to adopt tighter IPRs regimes in tandem with increasing income-
equality.  
 
Originality/value – It is the first empirical assessment of the incidence of piracy on 
inequality in Africa: a continent with stubbornly high poverty and inequality rates.  
 
JEL Classification: F42; K42; O34; O15; O55 
Keywords: Inequality; Piracy; Intellectual property rights; Africa 
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1. Introduction  
 
Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain substantial challenges to African economic 
and human developments (Asongu, 2012a). It has also become abundantly clear that, for any 
country, region or continent to be actively involved in the global economy, it must adopt 
competition as a benchmark to progress. Competition derives from intellectual capital, which 
is protected by intellectual property rights (IPRs) laws (treaties). In recent economic history, 
there has been a wide consensus on the key role that IPRs protection play in promoting 
innovation processes and economic growth. Much recently however, technological progress 
has not only brought about an increased availability of information and technology products, 
but also the proliferation of technology used to copy, unlawfully download or counterfeit such 
commodities. Given present efforts being placed on harmonizing the standard and 
enforcement of IPRs protection worldwide (Asongu, 2012b), whereas much has been debated 
about the incidence of IPRs on economic development in developing countries, the income-
redistributive role of piracy has remained unexplored in the literature.  
 Hitherto, much of the debate has centered on IPRs protection. While some scholars 
have postulated that increased IPRs stimulates growth and economic development through the 
rewarding impact on factor productivity (Gould & Gruben, 1996; Falvey et al., 2006), others  
are of the position that IPRs protection and adherence to international treaties (laws) may 
seriously limit the growth prospects of developing countries (Yang & Maskus, 2001). This 
skeptical strand is of the view that less tight IPRs regimes are necessary (at least in the short-
term) for developing countries, to enable knowledge spillovers, imperative for growth and 
development. According to their thesis, the existing technology in developing countries is 
more imitative and/or adaptive in nature and not suitable for the creation of new innovations. 
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The debate on HIV/AID drugs best illustrates this second stance and adds motivation to the 
current paper
1
.   
 In light of the above debate, there is increasing relevance of the impact of IPRs 
protection on promotion of innovation, technological advancements and economic 
development. Still, whereas theoretical literature has addressed the issue to some extent, little 
scholarly attention has been devoted to empirical literature. The existing bulk of empirical 
studies has examined the socio-economic determinants of piracy in several copyright 
industries (Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés, 2006ab; Bezmen & 
Depken, 2006; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Andrés & Goel, 2012). As 
far as we know, there is very scanty evidence on the piracy-inequality nexus. Andrés (2006a), 
a study closest to the present paper in the literature, has assessed the incidence of inequality 
on piracy in a ‘developed-countries’ focused framework. The present study steers clear of 
Andrés (2006a) from a number of dimensions (as will be discussed subsequently) and aims to 
examine the incidence of piracy on inequality in Africa. Results could provide the much 
needed policy guidance, given the growing concerns on IPRs, governance and poverty in the 
continent.  
 This paper’s contribution to the existing quantitative literature is threefold. Firstly, as 
far as we have reviewed, it is the first empirical study to assess the incidence of piracy on 
inequality in Africa. Secondly, the piracy-inequality nexus is contingent on the upholding of 
IPRs. In other words, it examines how IPRs laws (treaties) are instrumental in the income-
inequality nexus. Thirdly, given current efforts that have been devoted to fighting piracy in 
the continent, the study also assesses how governance mechanisms are instrumental in the 
effect of piracy on inequality.  The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. 
Section 2 examines existing literature. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined 
                                                 
1
This strand  has gained prominence in the debate over  if ‘permission’ should be granted to enable ‘copying’ of 
life-saving pharmaceuticals, especially those used in the management of HIV/AIDS in developing countries 
most affected and least likely to afford such treatments.  
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respectively in Section 3. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 
5.   
 
2. Literature review  
  
2.1 Intellectual property rights (IPRs) and development  
 
There are two main avenues along which intellectual property and the strength of IPRs 
regimes are thought to influence the level of economic growth and development (Bezmen & 
Depken, 2004). The first strand captures the extent to which IPRs affect the creation of new 
knowledge and information within nations, as well as the diffusion of existing knowledge 
across countries. The second strand is focused on the indirect effect of a nation’s IPRs regime 
on international transactions that provide factors necessary for the growth process.  
In the first strand on ‘creation and dissemination of information’, IPRs protection 
draws from the foundation of endogenous theories of economic growth whereby, investment 
in research and development (R&D) rewards individual investors with profit (returns) and 
also augment society’s stock of knowledge. Lowering the cost of future innovation improves 
the accumulation of knowledge for economic prosperity (Romer, 1990; Grossman & 
Helpman, 1991). The underlying wisdom of tighter IPRs regimes (with stricter adherence to 
IPRs) is based on the notion that, protection of IPRs serves as a stimulus to growth by 
motivating innovations and inventions. The recent tendency by many newly industrialized 
countries pushing for stronger IPRs through bilateral, multilateral and regional arrangements, 
point to the interest of developing countries to specialize in labor intensive production in 
agricultural industries. Until very recently, these industries have largely been supported by 
public expenditures on R & D and technology, and have greatly benefited from shared 
knowledge spillovers.  
The second strand looks at how IPRs can affect a nation’s growth and development 
process through their influence on a nation’s ability to engage in international transactions 
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such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows, trade and technology transfers (Bezmen & 
Depken, 2004). International trade has been presented by endogenous growth theories as an 
important stimulus to economic prosperity, as access to world markets could spur greater 
utilization of human resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003), and facilitate the transmission of 
technology by providing contact with foreign counterparts and direction of domestic resources 
towards more research intensive sectors. Nevertheless, these models do not necessarily predict 
that openness has contributed to economic growth in all countries under all circumstances; 
principally because, theoretical prediction depends on country-specific conditions. It has been 
substantially documented that stronger IPRs regimes are crucial in attracting the inflows of 
FDI and technology transfers (Lee & Mansfield, 1996), stimulating exports (Maskus & 
Penubarti, 1995) and increasing the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational 
enterprises (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996). On the other hand, stronger IPRs protection 
could mitigate the need for FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001).  
 
2.2 Piracy and inequality in Africa  
 As presented in Table 1 below, in addition to being one of the poorest regions in the 
world, Africa is also the world’s most inequitable region after Latin America. Inequalities 
have not substantially diminished overtime. Accordingly, in 2010, six out of ten most unequal 
countries worldwide were in Sub-Saharan African and more specifically in Southern Africa 
(African Development Bank: AfDB, 2012). The continent accounts for a substantial portion 
of the world’s people living in absolute poverty. Its share of the world’s poor rose from below 
20% to the neighborhood of 25% and nearly 50% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa 
lives on less than one US$ a day today: the world’s highest rate of extreme poverty. 
According to the AfDB, with the richest capturing the largest share of income, when 
measured by share of income that goes to the poorest, inequalities are striking; especially with 
geographic disparities between urban and rural areas where the poor are concentrated.  
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Table 1: Regional inequalities and software piracy  
 LAC ECA Asia Europe Africa 
 Gini Index 
1980-1989 52.1 22.8 36.7 23.9 41.1 
1990-1999 51.2 31.6 38.7 30.5 45.9 
2000-2009 52.2 33.4 37.5 32.5 43.9 
      
 Levels of software piracy (per 100 computers) 
2008 65% 66% 61% 35% 75% 
2009 63% 64% 59% 35% 74% 
      
 Software piracy levels in Africa 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Algeria 84% 84% 84% 84% 83% 
Botswana  82% 81% 82% 80% 79% 
Cameroon 84% 84% 84% 83% 83% 
Egypt 64% 63% 60% 59% 59% 
Ivory Coast  82% 82% 81% 80% 79% 
Kenya 81% 80% 81% 80% 79% 
Libya  --- --- 88% 87% 88% 
Mauritius  60% 59% 57% 57% 56% 
Morocco  68% 66% 67% 66% 66% 
Nigeria  82% 82% 82% 83% 83% 
Senegal  82% 81% 80% 79% 78% 
South Africa 36% 35% 34% 35% 35% 
Tunisia  81% 79% 76% 73% 72% 
Zambia  83% 82% 82% 82% 82% 
Zimbabwe  90% 91% 91% 92% 92% 
LAC: Latin America & the Caribbean. ECA: Europe and Central Asia. Data sources: the AfDB (2012) for 
inequality data and the BSA (2010) for piracy levels.  
 
 
The global piracy rate increased from 41% in 2008 to 43% in 2009 (BSA, 2010). As 
shown in Table 1, Africa has the highest level of software piracy with 74% of all software 
installed from pirated origins. With the exceptions of Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco and South 
Africa, the level of piracy is averagely in the neighborhood of 80%. Indeed, software piracy in 
Africa has reached an epidemic level (Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Asongu, 2012bcd). Consistent 
with the BSA (2010), software piracy in Africa is double the global rate. For instance, the 
commercial value of unlicensed software installed on personal computers (PCs) in Eastern 
and Southern Africa (ESA), which excludes South Africa reached $109 million in 2010 as 83 
% of software installed on PCs during the year was pirated. This stands at almost twofold the 
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global piracy level for PC software (that is 42 %), having soared by 3.6 points on the previous 
five year average. In light of the above, recent African oriented studies have focused on best 
governance tools that could be used to fight piracy (Andrés & Asongu, 2013), intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) protections channels that matter in the battle (Asongu, 2012cd) and, 
feasible timeframes for the harmonization of IPRs against the scourge (Asongu, 2012b). With 
growing levels in African income inequality, it is of policy relevance to assess whether 
current efforts in the fight against piracy are pro-poor or not.  
 
2.3 Piracy, IPRs protection and quality of institutions in Africa 
In light of the staggering statistics presented in Table 1 above, substantial efforts are 
being devoted to effectively tackle the rising phenomenon (IDC, 2009; El-Bialy, 2010; Fripp, 
2011; Blakeney and Mengistie, 2011; AFROL, 2012; Agabi, 2012). This section will be 
discussed in two main strands. The first will complement the statistics in Table 1 with glaring 
stylized facts on software piracy in selected African countries while the second will focus on 
the role of institutional measures in combating the growing phenomenon.   
In order to better understand the growing importance of piracy in Africa, we shall 
present stylized facts from selected African countries that best illustrate the situation, notably: 
Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt. Firstly, consistent with Agabi (2012), software developers are 
losing millions of naira annually to software thefts. The phenomenon is negatively affecting 
Nigeria’s economy and business experts are consistent with the position that, the issue of 
illegal software in the country is a serious one and an urgent solution is necessary because 
software usage is expected to increase over the coming years. Secondly, the Kenya Copyright 
Board is currently beefing-up its efforts in the fight against piracy.  Accordingly, it is reported 
that, the board planned to battle it with vigor in 2012 in order to increase investment potential 
and crackdown on illegal use of software (Fripp, 2011). Fripp elucidates that according to the 
board, there were to be sustained raids on suspected resellers of counterfeit software, in order 
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to reduce the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector’s losses which is 
losing thousands of new jobs and millions of dollars as a result of the piracy. With regard to 
the Executive Director of the Board, there are clear signs that the Board has resolved to 
uphold (and strengthen) Kenya’s IPRs laws/treaties/regimes by firmly dealing with those 
engaging in software piracy
2
. Thirdly, a study by the International Data Corporation (IDC) on 
Global Software Piracy has shown that Egypt is making considerable strides in tackling the 
issue. It is reported that, this is largely due to the improved collaboration between Egypt and 
the US on enforcement for IPRs cases (AFROL, 2012). According to the report, Egypt is fully 
committed to further reducing its piracy rating  and tackling the challenges facing the industry 
with a number of initiatives; among others, IPRs training for the Egyptian legal community 
and promotion of the copyright law (to increase awareness of IPRs and its role in sustaining 
economic growth and attracting foreign direct investment (FDI)).  
 In the second strand, we allocate space to discussing the role of institutions in IPRs 
protection. The World Trade Organization (WTO) can be counted among the different 
multilateral organizations that are laying emphasis on the importance of legal reforms in 
African countries. Hence, it guards African countries on the granting and protection of IPRs 
by given minimum requirement standards that should be fulfilled by each member country. A 
downside of this approach is that, its strategy is mainly based on promoting one-fits-all 
institutions. Therefore, it seems to ignore (or neglect) alternative institutional arrangements 
that could be used to reach efficient outcomes for the conflicting parties in a long-run (El-
Bialy, 2010) or how institutions and IPRs matter in the effect of piracy on poverty and 
inequality (as the present paper seeks to address). Accordingly, El-Bialy postulates that the 
phenomenon of inefficient IPRs institutions is more likely to be significant in developing 
countries because they may need “appropriate” IPRs enforcement strategies and, their 
                                                 
2
 “The Board remains ready and willing to support software copyright owners by intensifying enforcement 
efforts to reduce software piracy in our country and ensure that legitimate businesses reap the fruits of their 
labor as per the Kenya Copyright Board mandate” (Fripp, 2011).  
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institutions differ significantly from those prevailing in rich countries. For example, Rodrik 
(2008) has qualified them as ‘second-best institutions’ and described the institutional reforms 
promoted by multilateral organizations as being heavily biased towards a best-practice 
approach.   
The existing bulk of empirical studies has examined the socio-economic determinants 
of piracy in several copyright industries (Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Banerjee et al., 2005; 
Andrés, 2006ab; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; 
Andrés & Goel, 2012). As far as we know, there is very scanty evidence on the piracy-
inequality nexus. Andrés (2006a), a study closest to the present paper in the literature, has 
assessed the incidence of inequality on piracy. The results show that economic inequality has 
a negative incidence on national rates of piracy. The present study steers clear of Andrés 
(2006a) from three standpoints: (1) it is focused exclusively on Africa instead of developed-
world oriented; (2) IPRs, education & ICTs and good governance instruments are used to 
control for endogeneity in the piracy-inequality nexus with an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation approach, contrary to the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) employed by Andrés and; 
(3) the incidence of piracy on inequality is assessed and not the other way round.  
 
3. Data and methodology  
 
3.1 Data 
 
3.1.1 Dependent and independent variables  
 
The proxy for inequality is the GINI coefficient which appreciates disparity among 
values of the frequency income-distribution. A value of zero expresses perfect equality while 
a coefficient of one represents maximal inequality. As recently documented (Senadza, 2012; 
De Silva, 2013), the GINI coefficient which is commonly used as a measure of inequality in 
income or wealth has found application in diverse disciplines investigating inequality: 
sociology, economics, health science, agriculture…etc.  
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 The measure for piracy is the software piracy rate, which is defined as “the 
unauthorized copying of computer software which constitutes copyright infringement for 
either commercial or personal use” (SIIA, 2000). Software piracy may potentially take many 
avenues – e.g., organized copiers, piracy by individuals and commercial or business piracy. 
Hence, obtaining an accurate measure of the prevalence of software piracy remains a 
challenge in the literature. There are many types of piracy. According to the Business 
Software Alliance (BSA), we can distinguish among: 1) end user copying; 2) downloading 
and; 3) counterfeiting. The level of piracy is computed as the difference in demand for new 
software applications (estimated from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software. In the 
present, the measure of piracy employed is the percentage of software (primarily business 
software) in a country that is illegally installed (without a license) on an annual basis and is 
taken to capture the level of software piracy. This variable is reported in percentages, scaling 
from 0 % (no piracy) to 100 % (i.e., all software installed is of pirated origin). Piracy rates 
source from the Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2010). Additional information on 
measurement could be obtained from BSA (2009)
3
.  BSA is an industry group; nevertheless 
its data on software piracy is the best cross-country measure currently used in the literature, 
though object of some inherent upward bias.
4
 From a broad perspective, the data on software 
piracy could be viewed as proxying for the extent of digital piracy. 
   
3.1.2 Instrumental variables  
 
In this section, we devote space to providing justification for the empirical validity of 
the instrumental variables. This justification is essential for the relevance of the empirical 
analysis because, a theoretical basis for the instruments is imperative for sound and consistent 
                                                 
3
 Data from the BSA primarily measures the piracy of commercial software.  See Png (2008) and Traphagan & 
Griffith (1998) for a discussion on the reliability of piracy data. 
4
This data has been widely used in the piracy literature ( Marron & Steel, 2000; Banerjee et al., 2005; Andrés, 
2006ab; Goel & Nelson, 2009).  
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interpretation of estimated coefficients. In other words, while the object of this article is to 
assess the income-redistributive effect of piracy, it also indirectly aims to examine how IPRs 
laws, ICTs & education and good governance are instrumental in the incidence of piracy on 
income-inequality. The instrumental variable approach in the empirical section requires that 
the instruments be correlated with the main endogenous regressor. Logic and common-sense 
have it that, piracy and the instruments (IPRs laws, education, ICTs and government quality) 
move hand in hand. Save in utopia, we cannot discuss piracy while ignoring these 
instruments. Firstly, only with the recognition and upholding of IPRs can a government put in 
place tools for the fight against piracy (that hypothetically affect income-distribution). The 
most widely known IPRs instruments in the battle against piracy are: main IP law, IPRs law, 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties and Multilateral (Bilateral) treaties. 
Software piracy has been instrumented in recent empirical literature with these IPRs laws 
instruments (Andrés & Asongu, 2013). Secondly, theoretical underpinnings of good 
governance as instruments in the fight against software piracy have already been covered in 
the form of stylized facts presented in Section 2.3. Asongu (2012cd) has recently employed 
these government quality instruments in the African piracy literature. They include: 
corruption, government effectiveness, voice & accountability, corruption-control, rule of law, 
regulation quality and political stability. Thirdly, ICTs and education are also important 
determinants of software piracy because advancements in ICTs have rendered the 
dissemination of information and knowledge less object of real sector scrutiny in comparison 
to past decades. From intuition we: (1) use internet penetration and the number of personal 
computer (PC) users as ICT instruments  and; (2) adopt the literacy rate and research & 
development (R&D) expenditure as education instruments.  
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3.1.3 Control variables  
 
Owing constraints in degrees of freedom necessary for the overidentifying restrictions 
tests, we are unable to control for more than three variables
5
: economic prosperity (GDP 
growth), inflation and trade. (1) GDP growth may reduce inequality conditional on even-
distribution of the fruits of economic prosperity (Dao, 2009). The absence of any significant 
nexus between GDP growth and income-inequality could confirm growing fears that the 
relative high growth rates enjoyed by African countries (4.36% in the mean) do not trickle 
down from the macroeconomic to the microeconomic level. (2) The inflation rate (Bashir, 
2002) included to control for the macroeconomic environment could either have a positive or 
negative sign depending on whether it is high or low. Though inflation has been generally 
seen to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 2007) owing to decreased purchasing power, low inflation 
however has a negative incidence on inequality (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004). (3) Trade can 
either increase or decrease inequality depending on the proportion of the poor relying on 
agricultural exports. On the other hand, cheap imports could increase savings and hence 
improve the income-distribution of the poor. In the same vein, too much imports of 
‘substitution goods’ produced by domestic industries could fuel income-inequality if a great 
chunk of the population in the lower-income bracket depends on the affected industries for 
subsistence income. Moreover, imports reduce racial earning inequality by significantly 
decreasing the wage of low- and medium-skill non-whites (Agesa et al., 2011).  
Owing to constraints in data availability (for piracy rates), the data include annual 
observations for 11 African countries for the years 2000-2010. Details about the variable 
definitions and data sources, descriptive statistics with presentation of countries and 
correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations between key variables used in this paper) 
                                                 
5
An OIR test is only employable in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments must be higher 
than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact-identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition not possible. 
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are presented in the appendices.  The summary statistics (Appendix 1) of the variables used in 
the panel regressions show that there is quite a degree of variation in the data utilized so that 
one should be confident that reasonable estimated relationships should emerge. The purpose 
of the correlation matrix (Appendix 3) is to mitigate issues resulting from overparametization 
and multicolinearity.  Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any 
serious issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated. Variable definitions and 
corresponding sources are presented in Appendix 2.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Endogeneity  
 
While inequality could be endogenous to piracy, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out, 
since inequality can also be exogenous to piracy (Andrés, 2006a). We are therefore 
confronted here with an issue of endogeneity owing to reverse-causality since the piracy 
indicators are correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. To tackle this 
endogeneity concern, we shall assess its presence with the Hausman test before employing an 
estimation technique relevant to the outcome of the test.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique 
 
Borrowing from recent piracy literature (Andrés & Goel, 2012), the paper adopts a 
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique. IV 
estimation addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and hence avoids the inconsistency of 
estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are 
correlated with the error term in the main equation. The 2SLS estimation will entail the 
following steps: 
First-stage regression:  
 
 itiit sInstrumentPiracy )(10  it                       (1)             
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Second-stage regression: 
 
 itit PiracyInequality )(10  itiX  it             (2)                                                                                        
 
In Equation 2, X is a set of control variables (trade, GDP growth and inflation). In the 
first and second equations, it   and it  respectively represent the error terms. Instrumental 
variables are: IPRs laws (Main Intellectual Property Law, Intellectual Property Rights Law, 
WIPO Treaties, Multilateral Treaties and Bilateral Treaties), ICTs (internet penetration and 
number of PC users), education (literacy rate and R & D expenditure), and government 
quality dynamics (corruption, government effectiveness, voice & accountability, corruption-
control, rule of law, regulation quality and political stability). Inequality represents the GINI 
index while piracy is the software piracy rate.  
We adopt the following steps in the IV analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over 
an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the 
instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the explaining variable (piracy 
channel) and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the 
main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Further robustness checks 
will be ensured with; (1) robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
standard errors and; (2) restricted modeling.   
 
4. Empirical analysis  
 
This section aims to examine three main issues: (1) the ability of the instruments to 
explain the endogenous components of the piracy channel; (2) the capacity of the exogenous 
components of the piracy channel to explain inequality and; (3) the ability of instruments to 
explain inequality beyond the piracy channel. While the first issue is addressed with first-
stage regressions, the second and third concerns are assessed with the 2SLS regressions.  
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4.1 First stage regressions  
 
Table 2 below summarizes first-stage regressions in which the piracy rate and other 
second-stage control variables are regressed on the instrumental variables.  This is the first 
condition for the 2SLS-IV estimation in which the potential instruments must be correlated 
with the piracy channel under consideration.  Hence, the table reports an ‘essential first-stage 
regression’ which is crucial for the initial strength of the instruments and a ‘supplementary 
first-stage regression’ (for the 2SLS control variables) to confirm that the selected instruments 
are correlated with the endogenous explaining variable of interest (piracy rate). Models with 
an asterisk (*) are OLS with HAC standard errors. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C entail 
regressions with IPRs laws, education & ICTs and, government quality instruments 
respectively. Broadly across panels, the findings for the piracy channel overwhelmingly 
demonstrate that, the instruments jointly (taken together) enter significantly at the 1% 
significance level (Fisher statistics). Hence the instruments are strong, indicating that, 
distinguishing sampled African countries by IPRs laws (treaties), education & ICTs and 
government quality levels helps explain cross-country differences in software piracy levels. 
From Panel A, on a specific note, but for the IPRs laws that have a positive incidence on the 
piracy rate (contrary to expectation), the other IP laws (treaties) have a negative effect on 
piracy. The effects of WIPO and bilateral treaties are not significant. In Panel B and Panel C 
respectively, ICTs and good governance should intuitively increase and mitigate piracy 
respectively. Differences in signs are traceable to the high correlation between ICTs measures 
(internet penetration and PC users) and government quality dynamics respectively in Panel B 
and Panel C. The findings in Table 2 have no policy implications, as the regressions are 
simply meant to demonstrate that the instruments are correlated with the endogenous 
explaining variable of interest. Hence, discussing these to elaborate detail will be space 
consuming and out of scope. However, it is worth emphasizing that the insignificance of IPRs 
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laws (treaties) on economic prosperity could be due to the documented U-shaped relationship 
(Briggs, 2010).  
Table 2: First-stage (FS) regressions with (without) HAC standard errors 
         
 Essential FS regression Supplementary  FS regressions 
 Panel A: IPR laws (treaties) instruments  
 Piracy Inflation Trade Economic Prosperity 
 Model 1 Model 1* Model 2 Model 2* Model 3 Model 3* Model 4 Model 4* 
Constant  0.814*** 0.814*** 7.553*** 7.553 89.65*** 89.656*** 5.022*** 5.022*** 
 (6.960) (3.653) (2.929) (1.199) (11.38) (6.215) (5.110) (5.688) 
Main IP law -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.015 -0.015 -1.923*** -1.923** -0.064 -0.064 
 (-10.46) (-7.339) (-0.076) (-0.049) (-3.135) (-2.289) (-0.837) (-1.089) 
IPRs law 0.028** 0.028 -0.370 -0.370 1.980** 1.980 0.182 0.182* 
 (2.258) (1.580) (-1.166) (-1.057) (2.039) (1.311) (1.507) (1.864) 
WIPO Treaties  0.018 0.018 0.462 0.462 -9.236*** -9.236 -0.451 -0.451 
 (0.623) (0.273) (0.623) (0.335) (-4.067) (-1.483) (-1.600) (-1.535) 
Multilateral Treaties  -0.029*** -0.029* -0.069 -0.069 1.230** 1.230 0.056 0.056 
 (-3.803) (-1.807) (-0.366) (-0.253) (2.116) (0.790) (0.783) (1.020) 
Bilateral Treaties  -0.009 -0.009 -1.920* -1.920 -15.06*** -15.068 -0.276 -0.276 
 (-0.250) (-0.104) (-1.889) (-0.703) (-4.794) (-1.643) (-0.713) (-0.422) 
         
Adjusted R² 0.559 0.559 0.022 0.022 0.227 0.227 0.003 0.003 
Fisher  27.655*** 27.655*** 1.548 1.548 8.010*** 8.010*** 1.079 1.079 
Observations  106 106 121 121 120 120 121 121 
         
 Panel B: Information & Communication Technologies (ICTs) and Education  instruments 
 Piracy Inflation Trade Economic Prosperity 
 Model 5 Model 5* Model 6 Model 6* Model 7 Model 7* Model 8 Model 8* 
Constant  1.935*** 1.935*** -13.897 -13.897 -76.625 -76.625 14.079* 14.079*** 
 (3.856) (6.337) (-0.626) (-0.823) (-1.004) (-0.954) (1.912) (7.182) 
Internet Penetration  0.404**** 0.404*** -3.808 -3.808 8.301 8.301 2.104 2.104*** 
 (4.342) (5.343) (-0.986) (-0.807) (0.625) (0.634) (1.643) (5.326) 
PC Users  -0.752*** -0.752*** 4.956 4.956 -40.566** -40.566** -1.901 -1.901*** 
 (-5.799) (-7.044) (0.906) (0.836) (-2.157) (-2.482) (-1.048) (-2.915) 
Literacy rate  -0.365 -0.365 12.404 12.404 123.20*** 123.20** -5.614 -5.614*** 
 (-1.354) (-1.629) (1.035) (1.155) (2.990 (2.291) (-1.412) (-4.658) 
Research & Dev. -0.268** -0.268*** -13.151** -13.151** 22.102 22.102 0.698 0.698 
 (-2.221) (-2.879) (-2.564) (-2.148) (1.253) (1.629) (0.410) (0.866) 
Adjusted R² 0.877 0.877 0.196 0.196 0.458 0.458 0.148 0.148 
Fisher  51.187*** 51.187*** 2.894** 2.894** 7.551*** 7.551*** 2.347* 2.347* 
Observations  29  29 32 32 32 32 32 32 
         
 Panel C: Good Governance instruments 
 Piracy Inflation Trade Economic Prosperity 
 Model 9 Model 9* Model 10 Model 10* Model 11 Model 11* Model 12 Model 12* 
Constant  0.747*** 0.747*** -10.101* -10.101* 93.535*** 93.535*** 5.601** 5.601* 
 (3.006) (3.728) (-1.873) (-1.771) (6.098) (6.688) (2.324) (1.934) 
Corruption  -0.082 -0.082 4.216*** 4.216*** -4.885 -4.885 -0.344 -0.344 
 (-1.289) (-1.330) (3.050) (2.795) (-1.239) (-1.306) (-0.557) (-0.471) 
Rule of Law  -0.168* -0.168 3.776* 3.776 34.112*** 34.112*** 0.921 0.921 
 (-1.971) (-1.050) (1.851) (1.133) (5.941) (2.767) (1.010) (1.277) 
Regulation Quality  -0.144 -0.144 6.844** 6.844* -0.153 -0.153 1.584 1.584 
 (-1.118) (-1.038) (2.164) (1.720) (-0.015) (-0.010) (1.121) (1.182) 
Gov. Effectiveness  -0.957*** -0.957*** -13.92*** -13.92*** -13.994 -13.994 -2.742* -2.742** 
 (-6.267) (-2.843) (-3.885) (-2.763) (-1.372) (-1.035) (-1.711) (-2.440) 
Corruption-Control 0.863*** 0.863*** -7.906** -7.906* -7.123 -7.123 0.984 0.984 
 (6.297) (3.629) (-2.427) (-1.944) (-0.777) (-0.459) (0.676) (0.920) 
Political Stability  0.067 0.067 -0.209 -0.209 3.615 3.615 0.268 0.268 
 (1.206) (0.816) (-0.156) (-0.116) (0.944) (0.529) (0.448) (0.433) 
Voice & Account. 0.124* 0.124 3.597** 3.597 13.304*** 13.304* -0.028 -0.028 
 (1.844) (1.357) (2.236) (1.114) (2.881) (1.862) (-0.039) (-0.037) 
Adjusted R² 0.660 0.660 0.296 0.296 0.573 0.573 -0.012 -0.012 
Fisher  25.758*** 25.758*** 6.828*** 6.828*** 19.461*** 19.461*** 0.833 0.833 
Observations  90 90 98 98 97 97 98 98 
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*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-statistics in brackets. IP: Intellectual Property. HAC: 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. Model ()*: with HAC standard errors. PC: Personal Computer. Dev: 
Development. Gov: Government.  
 
 
4.2 Two-stage least squares  
 
This section discusses the second and third issues: the ability of the exogenous 
components of the piracy channel to explain inequality and, the capacity of the instruments to 
explain inequality beyond the piracy channel. To inspect these issues, we employ a 2SLS with 
IPRs laws, education & ICTs and government quality dynamics as instrumental variables.  
Whereas the second issue is addressed by the significance and signs of estimated 
coefficients, the third is solved with the Sargan-OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the 
position that, the instruments explain inequality only through the piracy mechanism, 
conditional on other covariates (control variables). Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is 
a rejection of the view that the instruments do not explain inequality beyond the piracy 
channels. A Hausman test is performed prior to the 2SLS-IV approach. The null hypothesis of 
this test is the stance that, estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent. 
Therefore, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity due to 
inconsistent estimates and hence, lends credit to the choice of the IV estimation technique. 
For almost all models under consideration, we find overwhelming evidence of endogeneity (at 
the 1% significance level) and proceed with the IV estimation.  
 
4.2.1 2SLS with IPRs laws (treaties) instruments  
While Panel A of Table 3 presents restricted 2SLS regressions, Panel B reports their 
unrestricted counterparts (with a constant). The first halves of both panels contain regressions 
without HAC standard errors while the second halves report estimates robust to HAC standard 
errors. Like in Table 2, the asterisk sign (*) denotes regressions with robust HAC standard 
errors.   
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Table 3: Restricted and Unrestricted 2SLS with IPRs laws (treaties) instruments  
         
 Dependent variable: Income Inequality 
         
 Panel A: Restricted 2SLS 
 2SLS without  HAC SE 2SLS with robust  HAC SE 
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 13* Model 14* Model 15* Model 16* 
Constant  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Piracy  72.22*** -18.206 -35.56*** -36.73*** 72.22*** -18.206 -35.56*** -36.73*** 
 (8.692) (-1.084) (-3.604) (-3.773) (5.060) (-0.771) (-3.495) (-3.263) 
Inflation  --- 7.120*** 2.975*** 2.673** --- 7.120*** 2.975*** 2.673*** 
  (6.606) (2.904) (2.359)  (4.787) (3.120) (3.115) 
Trade --- --- 0.556*** 0.453** --- --- 0.556*** 0.453 
   (4.956) (2.070)   (6.569) (1.060) 
GDPg  --- --- --- 2.100 --- --- --- 2.100 
    (0.539)    (0.268) 
         
Hausman 7.322*** 271.87*** 814.12*** 862.53*** 7.322*** 271.87*** 814.12*** 862.53*** 
         
Sargan OIR 67.746*** 7.453 0.935 0.722 67.746*** 7.453 0.935 0.722 
 [0.000 ] [0.113 ] [0.816 ] [0.696 ] [0.000 ] [0.113] [0.816 ] [0.696] 
Adjusted R² 0.183 0.026 0.062 0.048 0.183 0.026 0.062 0.048 
Fisher  --- --- 117.22*** 95.146*** --- --- 90.672*** 64.434*** 
Chi² --- 98.673*** --- --- --- 37.436*** --- --- 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
         
 Panel B: Unrestricted 2SLS 
 2SLS without  HAC SE 2SLS with robust  HAC SE 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 17* Model 18* Model 19* Model 20* 
Constant  53.274*** 44.271*** 13.398 11.238 53.274*** 44.271*** 13.398 11.238 
 (30.21) (9.507) (0.728) (0.353) (16.71) (9.145) (0.282) (0.190) 
Piracy  -24.34*** -26.31*** -33.41*** -34.03*** -24.34*** -26.31*** -33.41*** -34.030** 
 (-6.200) (-5.601) (-3.908) (-2.982) (-4.333) (-3.980) (-3.043) (-2.270) 
Inflation  --- 1.439** 2.354** 2.385* --- 1.439*** 2.354 2.385 
  (2.158) (1.975) (1.866)  (3.382) (1.308) (1.163) 
Trade --- --- 0.408* 0.408* --- --- 0.408 0.408 
   (1.842) (1.793)   (0.727) (0.715) 
GDPg  --- --- --- 0.481 --- --- --- 0.481 
    (0.084)    (0.077) 
         
Hausman 67.384*** 92.127*** 221.65*** 223.74*** 67.384*** 92.127*** 221.65*** 223.74*** 
         
Sargan OIR 22.339*** 11.591*** 0.879 0.835 22.339*** 11.591*** 0.879 0.835 
 [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.644 ] [0.360 ] [0.000 ] [0.008 ] [0.644 ] [0.360] 
Adjusted R² 0.173 0.168 0.073 0.056 0.173 0.168 0.073 0.056 
Fisher --- 16.283*** 5.244*** 3.726*** --- 10.164*** 4.422*** 4.738*** 
Chi² 38.435*** --- --- --- 18.772*** --- --- --- 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
         
Instruments  Constant; Main IP_Law; IPR_Law; WIPO Treaties; Multilateral Treaties; Bilateral Treaties  
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. z-statistics in brackets. [ ]: p-values.  2SLS: Two-Stage-Least 
Squares. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. SE: Standard Errors. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions 
test. Model ()*: with HAC standard errors. IP: Intellectual Property. IPR: Intellectual Property Right. WIPO: World 
Intellectual Property Organization.  
 
 
The significant difference between estimates without HAC standard errors and those 
with HAC standard errors indicate, issues of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation represent 
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significant noises that could seriously bias estimated coefficients. Hence, we base our 
conclusions on the second halves of the panels.   
Concerning the second issue of the empirical analysis, it could be established that: 
piracy has a positive income-redistributive effect. But for Model 13* (with invalid 
instruments) this finding is consistent for Models 14*, 15*, 16*, 17*, 18*, 19* and 20*. The 
third issue is only addressed by Models 15*, 16*, 19* and 20* because their null hypotheses 
of the Sargan-OIR test are not rejected. This implies, the IPRs instruments are valid and not 
correlated with the error term in the equation of interest (Eq. 2). In other words, the IPRs 
instrumental variables explain income-inequality through no other channels beside the piracy 
mechanism, conditional on the control variables. For the remaining models, while some suffer 
from endogeneity (13*, 17*, 18*), Model 14* has valid instruments with an insignificant 
piracy estimate.  
With regard to the control variables, the following conclusions could be drawn: (1) 
economic prosperity has no significant redistributive effect on inequality; (2) trade openness 
has an income disequalizing effect and; (3) inflation has a negative income redistributive 
effect.   
 
4.2.2 2SLS with Education and ICTs instruments  
While Panel A of Table 4 below presents restricted 2SLS regressions, Panel B reports 
their unrestricted counterparts (with a constant). The first halves of both panels contain 
regressions without HAC standard errors whereas the second halves report estimates robust to 
HAC standard errors. Like in Tables 2-3, the asterisk sign (*) denotes regressions with robust 
HAC standard errors.  Restricted regressions (Panel A) address the second issue but not the 
third issue because: (1) the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR is rejected for the most part and; 
(2) where the null of the Sargan test is not rejected (Model 24(24*)), the adjusted coefficient 
of determination (R²) has a negative explanatory power.  With a thin exception (Model 27*) 
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in unrestricted regressions (Panel B), both the second and third issues are addressed. Hence, 
the findings from Table 3 on the pro-poor character of software piracy are confirmed with a 
different set of instrumental variables in Table 4.   
 
Table 4: Restricted and Unrestricted 2SLS with ICTs & Education instruments  
         
 Dependent variable: Income Inequality 
         
 Panel A: Restricted 2SLS 
 2SLS without  HAC SE 2SLS with robust  HAC SE 
 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 21* Model 22* Model 23* Model 24* 
Constant  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Piracy  50.045* -53.871* -38.382** -42.42*** 50.045 -53.871 -38.382* -42.42*** 
 (1.931) (-1.895) (-2.078) (-2.850) (1.071) (-1.210) (-1.651) (-3.009) 
Inflation  --- 6.630*** -0.166 -0.052 --- 6.630*** -0.166 -0.052 
  (5.069) (-0.105) (-0.041)  (4.107) (-0.188) (-0.047) 
Trade --- --- 0.679*** 0.295* --- --- 0.679*** 0.295 
   (5.110) (1.769)   (3.739) (1.194) 
GDPg  --- --- --- 6.025*** --- --- --- 6.025 
    (2.980)    (2.221) 
         
Hausman 0.005 9.928*** 19.707*** 96.486*** 0.005 9.928*** 19.707*** 96.486*** 
         
Sargan OIR 22.088*** 12.750*** 6.316** 0.184 22.088*** 12.750*** 6.316** 0.184 
 [ 0.000] [ 0.005] [0.042 ] [0.667 ] [ 0.000] [0.005] [0.042] [0.667] 
Adjusted R² 0.337 0.059 -0.069 -0.060 0.337 0.059 -0.069 -0.060 
Fisher  --- --- 34.811*** 42.740*** --- --- 7.495*** 45.31*** 
Chi² --- 32.148*** --- --- --- 43.527*** --- --- 
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
         
 Panel B: Unrestricted 2SLS 
 2SLS without  HAC SE 2SLS with robust  HAC SE 
 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 25* Model 26* Model 27* Model 28* 
Constant  49.871*** 50.099*** 39.219*** 14.436*** 49.871*** 50.099*** 39.219** 14.436 
 (21.12) (11.77) (3.819) (0.417) (12.74) (13.75) (2.485) (0.629) 
Piracy  -26.46*** -26.10*** -27.75*** -38.44*** -26.46*** -26.10*** -27.75** -38.44*** 
 (-3.875) (-2.916) (-2.344) (-2.606) (-3.001) (-2.676) (-2.324) (-2.742) 
Inflation  --- -0.0452 -0.517 --- --- -0.045 -0.517 --- 
  (-0.065) (-0.526)   (-0.073) (-0.639)  
Trade --- --- 0.192 0.234 --- --- 0.192 0.234 
   (1.263) (1.304)   (0.712) (1.024) 
GDPg  --- --- --- 3.926 --- --- --- 3.926 
    (0.739)    (1.203) 
         
Hausman 10.941*** 13.924*** 32.417*** 43.086*** 10.941*** 13.924*** 32.417*** 43.086*** 
         
Sargan OIR 4.042 3.957 0.491 0.063 4.042 3.957 0.491 0.063 
 [0.256 ] [0.138 ] [0.483 ] [0.801 ] [0.256] [0.138 ] [0.491 ] [0.801 ] 
Adjusted R² 0.307 0.262 0.006 0.004 0.307 0.262 0.006 0.004 
Fisher --- 7.025*** 3.243** 2.934* --- 4.437** 2.175 2.536* 
Chi² 15.012*** --- --- --- 9.004*** --- --- --- 
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
         
Instruments  Constant; Internet penetration; PC Users; Literacy; Research & Development  
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. z-statistics in brackets. [ ]: p-values.  2SLS: Two-Stage-Least 
Squares. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. SE: Standard Errors. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions 
test. Model ()*: with HAC standard errors. PC: Personal Computer.  
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4.2.3 2SLS with Good Governance instruments  
While Panel A of Table 5 below presents restricted 2SLS regressions, Panel B reports 
their unrestricted counterparts (with a constant). The first halves of both panels contain 
regressions without HAC standard errors whereas the second halves report estimates robust to 
HAC standard errors. Like in Tables 2-4, the asterisk sign (*) denotes regressions with robust 
HAC standard errors.   
Table 5: Restricted and Unrestricted 2SLS with Good governance instruments  
         
 Dependent variable: Income Inequality 
         
 Panel A: Restricted 2SLS 
 2SLS without  HAC SE 2SLS with robust  HAC SE 
 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 29* Model 30* Model 31* Model 32* 
Constant  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
         
Piracy  74.338*** 12.883 0.666 1.580 74.338*** 12.883 0.666 1.580 
 (8.381) (0.988) (0.102) (0.119) (11.72) (0.546) (0.038) (0.098) 
Inflation  --- 4.931 0.434 0.378 --- 4.931*** 0.434 0.378 
  (5.912) (0.697) (0.403)  (3.211) (1.586) (0.278) 
Trade --- --- 0.605*** 0.638 --- --- 0.605*** 0.638 
   (0.000) (1.520)   (4.063) (0.749) 
GDPg  --- --- --- -0.494 --- --- --- -0.494 
    (-0.079)    (-0.045) 
         
Hausman 17.710*** 46.370*** 29.634*** 27.321*** 17.710*** 46.370*** 29.634*** 27.321*** 
         
Sargan OIR 48.069*** 30.556*** 43.773*** 42.457*** 48.069*** 30.556*** 43.773*** 42.457*** 
 [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [ 0.000] [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000] 
Adjusted R² 0.193 -0.008 -0.029 -0.044 0.193 -0.008 -0.029 -0.044 
Fisher  --- --- 202.87*** 145.46*** --- --- 414.88*** 360.85*** 
Chi² --- 124.41*** --- --- --- 54.263*** --- --- 
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
         
 Panel B: Unrestricted 2SLS 
 2SLS without  HAC SE 2SLS with robust  HAC SE 
 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36 Model 33* Model 34* Model 35* Model 36* 
Constant  48.211*** 46.478*** 48.030*** 56.792*** 48.211*** 46.478*** 48.030*** 56.792* 
 (27.63) (18.80) (8.578) (2.602) (8.244) (8.262) (5.614) (1.882) 
Piracy  -9.870*** -10.95*** -11.23*** 12.767 -9.870 -10.954 -11.238 12.767 
 (-2.602) (-2.818) (-2.802) (0.469) (-0.981) (-1.115) (-1.129) (0.477) 
Inflation  --- 0.329 0.364 -1.230 --- 0.329 0.364 -1.230 
  (0.971) (1.015) (-0.613)  (1.472) (1.180) (-0.711) 
Trade --- --- -0.025 0.809 --- --- -0.025 0.809 
   (-0.309) (0.946)   (-0.303) (1.059) 
GDPg  --- --- --- -14.155 --- --- --- -14.155 
    (-1.040)    (-1.087) 
         
Hausman 2.727* 2.093 1.917 22.284*** 2.727* 2.093 1.917 22.284*** 
         
Sargan OIR 54.256*** 56.151*** 56.394*** 3.262 54.256*** 56.151*** 56.394*** 3.262 
 [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [0.352 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [0.352 ] 
Adjusted R² 0.181 0.207 0.198 -0.059 0.181 0.207 0.198 -0.059 
Fisher --- 3.985** 2.665** 0.425 --- 1.465 1.317 0.620 
Chi² 6.772*** --- --- --- 0.963 --- --- --- 
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
         
Instruments  Constant; RL; RQ; Gov. E; PolSta; CPI; V&A; CC  
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*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. z-statistics in brackets. [ ]: p-values.  2SLS: Two-Stage-Least 
Squares. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. SE: Standard Errors. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions 
test. Model ()*: with HAC standard errors. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. 
PolSta: Political Stability. CPI: Corruption Perception Index. V&A: Voice & Accountability. CC: Corruption Control.  
 
Restricted and unrestricted  regressions (Panel A and Panel B respectively) address the 
second issue but not the third issue because: (1) the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR is 
rejected for the most part and; (2) where the null of the Sargan test is not rejected (Model 
36(36*)), the adjusted coefficient of determination (R²) has a negative explanatory power. 
Though the estimated piracy coefficients have the rights signs in Panel B, rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the Sargan test indicates that, government quality instruments do not mitigate 
inequality only through the piracy channel (conditional on the control variables). In other 
words, other instruments beside formal institutions are necessary for a pro-poor piracy effect. 
These instruments include among others; IPRs laws, education & ICTs used above.  
 
4.3 Discussion, policy implications and caveats  
 
4.3.1 Discussion and policy implications  
 The findings have shown a positive income-redistributive effect for software piracy. In 
other words, piracy maybe good for the poor. The income equalizing effect of software piracy 
is a fairly simple phenomenon to understand. Given the high cost of computer software, a 
great chunk of the population from the lowest income strata cannot afford to buy original 
software packages. Hence illegal copying, unauthorized downloading and counterfeiting 
become the only alternative means to obtaining the desired software packages. By purchasing 
cheap pirated software, computer literates in the lower income strata can save money for other 
utilities. Hence, an indirect increase in their purchasing power. This interpretation is 
consistent with the relevance of the hypothesis that, the poor are more prone to using pirated 
software (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011, 1-2).  Moores & Esichaikul have found a strong 
negative relationship between economic wealth and the level of software piracy, such that 
poorer countries tend to have higher levels of software piracy. The high cost of software is 
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often cited as a motivating factor for pirating software. At a micro economic level, this 
explanation lends credit to our findings.  
 Beside economic considerations, another factor that could elucidate the income-
equalizing effect of piracy in Africa is cultural. It has been firmly established that countries 
with a more collectivist society also tend to have higher levels of software piracy (Moores & 
Esichaikul, 2011, 2). High collectivist income groups are usually those at the bottom of the 
income distribution because, people become more individualistic as they grow richer. Hence, 
the natural conclusion that sharing and commercialization of cheap pirated software is among 
the faction of the population making-up the lower income strata.  The findings are consistent 
with a great bulk of the literature that has examined the determinants of the willingness to 
pirate software (by assessing the socio-economic factors that affect piracy). The conclusion 
drawn from these studies is that, nations with higher income and greater individualism have 
lower piracy rates (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995; Gould & Gruben, 1996; Park & Ginarte, 1997; 
Rushing & Thompson, 1996, 1999; Husted, 2000; Marron & Steel, 2000; Kranenberg & 
Hogenbirk, 2003; Kim, 2004; Depken & Simmons, 2004). Our findings concur with the 
above studies from a microeconomic standpoint.  
 Our finding has also shed some light on the current debate over IPRs protection. While 
some are postulating increased protection of IPRs as means of stimulating economic growth 
and development through the appealing impact on factor productivity (Gould & Gruben, 
1996; Falvey et al., 2006), others are skeptical and of the position that IPRs protection and 
adherence to international treaties (laws) may seriously limit the growth prospects of 
developing countries (Yang & Maskus, 2001). This latter school of thought is of the view 
that, less tight IPRs regimes are necessary (at least in the short-run) for developing countries, 
to enable knowledge spillovers, imperative for growth and development. The findings of this 
paper have reconciled this debate with the bridge that, less tight IPRs regimes in the short-run 
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are good for the poor as they enhance the benefits of knowledge spillovers. However, as 
income-inequality decreases, the adoption of tighter IPRs regimes will facilitate inflows of 
FDI and technological transfers (Lee & Mansfield, 1996), stimulate exports (Maskus & 
Penubarti, 1995) and increase the likelihood of investment undertaken by multinational 
enterprises (Mansfield, 1994; Seyoum, 1996).  
 The following discussion concerns the control variables in Table 3. (1) A negative or 
positive sign was expected from the estimated coefficient of economic prosperity. The 
absence of any significant nexus between GDP growth and income-inequality confirms 
growing fears that the relative high growth rates enjoyed by African countries (4.36% in the 
mean) do not trickle down from the macroeconomic to the microeconomic level. (2) Inflation 
was also included to control for the macroeconomic environment and was expected to either 
have a positive or negative sign depending on its rate. Though inflation has been generally 
seen to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 2007) owing to decreased purchasing power, low inflation 
however has a negative incidence on inequality (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004). The relative high 
inflation rate (6.96% in the mean) confirms the disequalizing income-distribution inflationary 
effect in the results. (3) The positive incidence of trade openness on inequality has two 
possible interpretations: on the one hand, the proportion of exports originating from the poor 
is quite low; on the other hand, cheap imports are stifling the domestic industries on which the 
poor substantially depend for income.  
 It is also interesting to discuss some ethical implications of software piracy in Africa. 
Inequality could be further mitigated owing to software piracy from four main ethical 
standpoints:  (1) the seller of pirated software thinks (S)he is right to continue her (his) 
business because the company may incur more expenses taking the matter to court; (2) users 
of pirated software think it is right to use pirated commodities because they are poor; (3) 
illegal copying might be based on interpersonal trust as those who either copy or share 
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software with others must trust that the software contains no viruses and; (4) moreover, 
individuals distributing illegal copies to others must trust these persons not to report to the 
police. 
 
4.3.2 Caveats   
Two main caveats have been retained: limitations in the measurement of software 
piracy and, the perception based good governance measures that may be subject to substantial 
bias due to media propaganda.  
Firstly, on the measurement of software piracy, three points are relevant (Asongu, 
2012c). (1) Accordingly, the ‘piracy level is computed as the difference in demand for new 
software applications (computed from PC shipments) and the legal supply of software’. It is 
worth noting that, this metric defines piracy as the drop in demand of software products. 
Hence, all pirated copies constitute lost sales. (2) It has also been substantially documented 
that, those who buy pirated copies do not always have the money to buy the true commodity. 
Hence, to consider the use of pirated products as diminishing demand for originals could be 
some kind of overstatement. (3) The employment of the metric presupposes knowledge of the 
elasticity of demand for the original product. Otherwise, there will be a comparison of pirated 
products that constitute loss in sales with ones that do not. Therefore, there is some upward 
bias in the software piracy estimate.  
Secondly, good governance indicators are perception based measures that may be 
subject to a considerable degree of media propaganda. This downside has been mitigated 
with: (1) the use of a broad range of government quality indicators; (2) the use of other IPRs 
and ICTs (and education) alternative instrumental variables and; (3) the adoption of an 
endogeneity based estimation approach that accounts for measurement errors and variable 
collection errors. Ultimately, as far as we have reviewed (Asongu, 2012e), there are no better 
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government quality indicators than those available in the World Bank Development 
Indicators.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain substantial challenges to economic and 
human developments. There is also a growing role of IPRs protection, especially with 
advances in ICTs. While existing piracy literature has focused on the socio-economic 
determinants of piracy, but for Andrés (2006a), the piracy-inequality nexus has remained 
unexplored. The current paper which steers clear of Andrés (2006a) from three standpoints
6
  
has had a threefold contribution to the literature. Firstly, as far as we have reviewed, it is the 
first empirical study to assess the incidence of piracy on inequality in Africa. Secondly, the 
piracy-inequality nexus is contingent on the upholding of IPRs. In other words, it has 
examined how IPRs laws (treaties) are instrumental in the effect of piracy on income-
inequality. Thirdly, given current efforts that have been devoted to fighting piracy in the 
continent, the study has also assessed how governance mechanisms are instrumental in the 
effect of piracy on inequality. The main finding suggests that, software piracy is good for the 
poor as it has a positive income-redistributive effect. This finding is consistent with recent 
piracy literature (Moores & Esichaikul, 2011)   from both economic and cultural 
considerations. ICTs & education (dissemination of knowledge) are instrumental in this 
positive redistributive effect, while good governance mitigates inequality beyond the piracy 
channel.  
As a policy implication, in the adoption tight IPRs regimes, sampled countries should 
take account of the role less stringent IPRs regimes play on income-redistribution through 
                                                 
6
The present paper has steered clear of Andrés (2006a) from three standpoints: (1) it has focused exclusively on 
Africa instead of developed-world oriented; (2) IPRs, education & ICTs and good governance instruments have 
been used to control for endogeneity in the piracy-inequality nexus using an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
estimation approach, contrary to the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) employed by Andrés (2006a) and; (3) the 
incidence of piracy on inequality has been assessed and not the other way round. 
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software piracy. Collateral benefits include among others, the cheap dissemination of 
knowledge through ICTs which African countries badly need in their quest to become 
‘knowledge economies’. A caveat however is that, too much piracy may decrease incentives 
to innovate. Hence, the need to adopt tighter IPRs regimes in tandem with increasing income-
equality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
Dependent Variable Inequality (GINI) 44.216 8.574 32.140 67.400 92 
       
Independent Variable Piracy rate 2.745 1.857 0.000 5.250 121 
       
 
Control Variables  
Inflation  6.963 5.736 -1.050 26.240 121 
Trade Openness  70.03 19.711 39.01 134.52 120 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.360 2.165 -3.653 10.600 121 
       
 
IPRs laws (treaties) 
Instrumental Variables  
Main IP law 2.256 2.835 0.000 11.000 121 
IPRs law 1.438 1.944 0.000 7.000 121 
WIPO Treaties  2.735 0.793 2.000 4.000 121 
Multilateral Treaties 9.628 3.304 4.000 17.00 121 
Bilateral Treaties  0.322 0.535 0.000 2.000 121 
       
 
ICTs & Education 
Instrumental Variables  
Internet Penetration  2.888 0.799 1.301 4.727 121 
Personal Computer Users  2.633 0.527 1.699 3.758 121 
Literacy   1.826 0.097 1.572 1.956 110 
Research and Development  0.395 0.290 0.006 0.946 32 
       
 
 
Good Governance 
Instrumental Variables  
Rule of Law -0.302 0.687 -1.657 1.053 110 
Regulation Quality -0.180 0.547 -1.305 0.905 110 
Corruption  3.369 1.266 1.000 6.400 117 
Government Effectiveness  5.058 11.362 -34.882 80.449 103 
Voice & Accountability  -0.277 0.696 -1.256 1.047 110 
Control of Corruption  -0.309 0.641 -1.236 1.086 110 
Political Stability (No Violence)  -0.393 0.842 -2.094 0.996 110 
       
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Zambia.  
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Panel A: Dependent and Independent Variables  
    
Inequality  GINI Income Inequality Index World Bank (WDI) 
    
Piracy  Piracy  Logarithm Piracy rate (annual %) BSA 
    
Panel B: Control Variables  
    
Inflation  Inflation Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness   Trade Import plus Exports of Commodities (% of GDP)   World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic Prosperity   GDPg GDP Growth Rate (annual %)   World Bank (WDI) 
    
Panel C: IPRs laws (treaties) Instrumental Variables  
    
Main IP law  MIPlaw Main Intellectual Property Law WIPO 
    
IPRs law IPlaw Intellectual Property Rights Law WIPO 
    
WIPO Treaties  WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization  Treaties  WIPO 
    
Multilateral Treaties  Multilat Multilateral  IP Treaties  WIPO 
    
Bilateral Treaties  Bilat Bilateral  IP Treaties WIPO 
    
Panel D: ICTs and Education Instrumental Variables  
    
Internet Penetration  Internet  Logarithm of Internet Users per 1000 GMID 
    
Personal Computer  Users PC  Logarithm of Personal Computer Users per Capita  GMID 
    
Literacy   Literacy  Logarithm of Adult  Literacy Rate (% of population aged 
above 15) 
GMID 
    
Research & Development R & D Research & Development Expenditures (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Panel E: Good Governance Instrumental Variables  
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL  
Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Regulation Quality  
 
RQ 
Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the 
ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption  
 
CPI 
Corruption Perception Index or perceived levels of 
corruption (the misuse of public power for private 
benefit) as determined by expert assessments and 
opinion surveys. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness  
 
Gov. E 
Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Voice & Accountability  
 
V&A 
Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to 
enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Control of Corruption  
 
CC 
Control of corruption (estimate): captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
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grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of 
the state by elites and private interests. 
    
 
Political Stability (No 
Violence) 
 
PolSta 
Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured 
as the perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism. 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  BSA: Business Software Alliance. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WIPO: World Intellectual 
Property Organization. IP: Intellectual Property. GMID: Global Market Information Database.  
 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
             
Panel A: Correlation Analysis with IPRs laws (treaties) Instrumental Variables   
Inequality 
(GINI) 
Piracy 
rate 
Control variables IPRs laws (treaties) Instrumental variables   
Inflation Trade GDPg MIPlaw IPlaw WIPO Multilat Bilat  
1.000 -0.428 0.098 -0.058 -0.070 0.764 -0.137 -0.318 -0.491 -0.454 GINI 
 1.000 0.146 -0.050 0.174 -0.715 -0.017 0.320 0.026 0.015 Piracy  
  1.000 0.151 0.176 -0.016 -0.150 0.024 -0.120 -0.210 Inflation 
   1.000 0.095 -0.173 0.079 -0.148 0.126 -0.281 Trade 
    1.000 -0.036 0.132 -0.061 0.108 -0.007 GDPg 
     1.000 0.103 -0.273 -0.221 -0.071 MIPlaw 
      1.000 0.308 0.443 0.143 IPlaw 
       1.000 0.311 -0.052 WIPO 
        1.000 0.261 Multilat 
      1.000 Bilat 
             
Panel B: Correlation Analysis with ICTs & Education Instrumental Variables  
Inequality 
(GINI) 
Piracy 
rate 
Control variables ICTs & Education Instrumental Variables    
Inflation Trade GDPg Internet PC Literacy R& D  
1.000 -0.428 0.099 -0.058 -0.070 0.090 0.260 0.491 0.684 GINI 
 1.000 0.146 -0.050 0.174 -0.184 -0.625 -0.348 -0.821 Piracy  
  1.000 0.151 0.176 -0.040 -0.047 0.161 -0.464 Inflation 
   1.000 0.095 -0.235 -0.266 0.262 -0.176 Trade 
    1.000 0.140 0.035 -0.130 -0.032 GDPg 
     1.000 0.840 -0.105 0.409 Internet 
      1.000 -0.003 0.658 PC 
       1.000 0.265 Literacy  
        1.000 R&D 
            
Panel C: Correlation Analysis with Good Governance Instrumental Variables  
Inequality 
(GINI) 
Piracy 
rate 
Control variables Good Governance Instrumental Variables  
Inflation Trade GDPg RL RQ CPI Gov. E V&A CC PolSta  
1.000 -0.428 0.099 -0.058 -0.070 0.044 0.420 0.304 0.441 0.597 0.305 0.235 GINI 
 1.000 0.146 -0.050 0.174 -0.508 -0.602 -0.480 -0.609 -0.420 -0.432 -0.291 Piracy  
  1.000 0.151 0.176 -0.136 -0.073 -0.143 -0.108 0.041 -0.184 -0.042 Inflation 
   1.000 0.095 0.578 0.470 0.430 0.532 0.579 0.505 0.491 Trade 
    1.000 -0.073 -0.095 -0.095 0.013 -0.003 -0.058 -0.073 GDPg 
     1.000 0.871 0.887 0.886 0.727 0.902 0.828 RL 
      1.000 0.884 0.931 0.846 0.867 0.764 RQ 
       1.000 0.916 0.759 0.940 0.779 CPI 
        1.000 0.833 0.942 0.712 Gov. E 
         1.000 0.796 0.722 V&A 
          1.000 0.779 CC 
           1.000 PolSta 
             
MIPlaw: Main Intellectual Property Law. IPlaw: Intellectual Property Rights Law. WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties. Multilat: Multilateral IP 
Treaties. Bilat: Bilateral IP Treaties.  PC: Personal Computer Users. R&D: Research & Development. RL: Rule of Law. RQ: Regulation Quality. CPI: Corruption 
Perception Index. Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. V&A: Voice & Accountability. CC: Control of Corruption. PolSta: Political Stability.  
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